Choice from Non-Choice: Predicting Consumer Preferences from Blood Oxygenation Level-Dependent Signals Obtained during Passive Viewing

Decision-making is often viewed as a two-stage process, where subjective values are first assigned to each option and then the option of the highest value is selected. Converging evidence suggests that these subjective values are represented in the striatum and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). A separate line of evidence suggests that activation in the same areas represents the values of rewards even when choice is not required, as in classical conditioning tasks. However, it is unclear whether the same neural mechanism is engaged in both cases. To address this question we measured brain activation with functional magnetic resonance imaging while human subjects passively viewed individual consumer goods. We then sampled activation from predefined regions of interest and used it to predict subsequent choices between the same items made outside of the scanner. Our results show that activation in the striatum and MPFC in the absence of choice predicts subsequent choices, suggesting that these brain areas represent value in a similar manner whether or not choice is required

Testing the Reward Prediction Error Hypothesis with an Axiomatic Model

Neuroimaging studies typically identify neural activity correlated with the predictions of highly parameterized models, like the many reward prediction error (RPE) models used to study reinforcement learning. Identified brain areas might encode RPEs or, alternatively, only have activity correlated with RPE model predictions. Here, we use an alternate axiomatic approach rooted in economic theory to formally test the entire class of RPE models on neural data. We show that measurements of human neural activity from the striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and posterior cingulate cortex satisfy necessary and sufficient conditions for the entire class of RPE models. However, activity measured from the anterior insula falsifies the axiomatic model, and therefore no RPE model can account for measured activity. Further analysis suggests the anterior insula might instead encode something related to the salience of an outcome. As cognitive neuroscience matures and models proliferate, formal approaches of this kind that assess entire model classes rather than specific model exemplars may take on increased significance

Neural Random Utility: Relating Cardinal Neural Observables to Stochastic Choice Behavior

We assess whether a cardinal model can be used to relate neural observables to stochastic choice behavior. We develop a general empirical framework for relating any neural observable to choice prediction and propose a means of benchmarking their predictive power. In a previous study, measurements of neural activity were made while subjects considered consumer goods. Here, we find that neural activity predicts choice behavior with the degree of stochasticity in choice related to the cardinality of the measurement. However, we also find that current methods have a significant degree of measurement error which severely limits their inferential and predictive performance

A quantitative description of the transition between intuitive altruism and rational deliberation in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma experiments

What is intuitive: pro-social or anti-social behaviour? To answer this fundamental question, recent studies analyse decision times in game theory experiments under the assumption that intuitive decisions are fast and that deliberation is slow. These analyses keep track of the average time taken to make decisions under different conditions. Lacking any knowledge of the underlying dynamics, such simplistic approach might however lead to erroneous interpretations. Here we model the cognitive basis of strategic cooperative decision making using the Drift Diffusion Model to discern between deliberation and intuition and describe the evolution of the decision making in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma experiments. We find that, although initially people's intuitive decision is to cooperate, rational deliberation quickly becomes dominant over an initial intuitive bias towards cooperation, which is fostered by positive interactions as much as frustrated by a negative one. However, this initial pro-social tendency is resilient, as after a pause it resets to the same initial value. These results illustrate the new insight that can be achieved thanks to a quantitative modelling of human behavior

A Unifying Theory of Biological Function

A new theory that naturalizes biological function is explained and compared with earlier etiological and causal role theories. Etiological theories explain functions from how they are caused over their evolutionary history. Causal role theories analyze how functional mechanisms serve the current capacities of their containing system. The new proposal unifies the key notions of both kinds of theories, but goes beyond them by explaining how functions in an organism can exist as factors with autonomous causal efficacy. The goal-directedness and normativity of functions exist in this strict sense as well. The theory depends on an internal physiological or neural process that mimics an organism’s fitness, and modulates the organism’s variability accordingly. The structure of the internal process can be subdivided into subprocesses that monitor specific functions in an organism. The theory matches well with each intuition on a previously published list of intuited ideas about biological functions, including intuitions that have posed difficulties for other theories

Combining Computational Fluid Dynamics and Agent-Based Modeling: A New Approach to Evacuation Planning

We introduce a novel hybrid of two fields—Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) and Agent-Based Modeling (ABM)—as a powerful new technique for urban evacuation planning. CFD is a predominant technique for modeling airborne transport of contaminants, while ABM is a powerful approach for modeling social dynamics in populations of adaptive individuals. The hybrid CFD-ABM method is capable of simulating how large, spatially-distributed populations might respond to a physically realistic contaminant plume. We demonstrate the overall feasibility of CFD-ABM evacuation design, using the case of a hypothetical aerosol release in Los Angeles to explore potential effectiveness of various policy regimes. We conclude by arguing that this new approach can be powerfully applied to arbitrary population centers, offering an unprecedented preparedness and catastrophic event response tool

Translating upwards: linking the neural and social sciences via neuroeconomics

The social and neural sciences share a common interest in understanding the mechanisms that underlie human behaviour. However, interactions between neuroscience and social science disciplines remain strikingly narrow and tenuous. We illustrate the scope and challenges for such interactions using the paradigmatic example of neuroeconomics. Using quantitative analyses of both its scientific literature and the social networks in its intellectual community, we show that neuroeconomics now reflects a true disciplinary integration, such that research topics and scientific communities with interdisciplinary span exert greater influence on the field. However, our analyses also reveal key structural and intellectual challenges in balancing the goals of neuroscience with those of the social sciences. To address these challenges, we offer a set of prescriptive recommendations for directing future research in neuroeconomics

Led into Temptation? Rewarding Brand Logos Bias the Neural Encoding of Incidental Economic Decisions

Human decision-making is driven by subjective values assigned to alternative choice options. These valuations are based on reward cues. It is unknown, however, whether complex reward cues, such as brand logos, may bias the neural encoding of subjective value in unrelated decisions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we subliminally presented brand logos preceding intertemporal choices. We demonstrated that priming biased participants' preferences towards more immediate rewards in the subsequent temporal discounting task. This was associated with modulations of the neural encoding of subjective values of choice options in a network of brain regions, including but not restricted to medial prefrontal cortex. Our findings demonstrate the general susceptibility of the human decision making system to apparently incidental contextual information. We conclude that the brain incorporates seemingly unrelated value information that modifies decision making outside the decision-maker's awareness

Dynamic Integration of Reward and Stimulus Information in Perceptual Decision-Making

In perceptual decision-making, ideal decision-makers should bias their choices toward alternatives associated with larger rewards, and the extent of the bias should decrease as stimulus sensitivity increases. When responses must be made at different times after stimulus onset, stimulus sensitivity grows with time from zero to a final asymptotic level. Are decision makers able to produce responses that are more biased if they are made soon after stimulus onset, but less biased if they are made after more evidence has been accumulated? If so, how close to optimal can they come in doing this, and how might their performance be achieved mechanistically? We report an experiment in which the payoff for each alternative is indicated before stimulus onset. Processing time is controlled by a “go” cue occurring at different times post stimulus onset, requiring a response within msec. Reward bias does start high when processing time is short and decreases as sensitivity increases, leveling off at a non-zero value. However, the degree of bias is sub-optimal for shorter processing times. We present a mechanistic account of participants' performance within the framework of the leaky competing accumulator model [1], in which accumulators for each alternative accumulate noisy information subject to leakage and mutual inhibition. The leveling off of accuracy is attributed to mutual inhibition between the accumulators, allowing the accumulator that gathers the most evidence early in a trial to suppress the alternative. Three ways reward might affect decision making in this framework are considered. One of the three, in which reward affects the starting point of the evidence accumulation process, is consistent with the qualitative pattern of the observed reward bias effect, while the other two are not. Incorporating this assumption into the leaky competing accumulator model, we are able to provide close quantitative fits to individual participant data